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Causal pluralism is increasingly gaining interest as a promising alternative for
monistic approaches toward causation. However, although the debate is scarcely
out of the egg, the term ‘causal pluralism’ already covers diverse meanings. This
creates confusion, and to remedy that confusion, it is necessary to discern different
kinds of pluralistic approaches to causation and different possible positions within
them. In this paper, I argue for a general distinction between conceptual causal plu-
ralism, metaphysical causal pluralism and epistemological-methodological causal
pluralism. I mainly focus on metaphysical approaches to causation and discern
herein four possible positions: metaphysical causal constructivism, metaphysi-
cal causal monism, weak metaphysical causal pluralism, and strong metaphysical
causal pluralism. Each of these positions are further related to their most obvi-
ous conceptual counterpart, specifically conceptual causal monism or conceptual
causal pluralism.
1. Introduction
Traditionally, philosophers concerned with causation have been reasoning
from monistic presuppositions. They have supposed that causation is a uni-
vocal concept referring to a single kind of relation in the world. Recently,
alternative approaches have emerged within the debate on causal pluralism.
Causal pluralism indeed forms a promising alternative to causal monism,
and the interest for this alternative view is steadfastly growing. However,
although the literature on ‘causal pluralism’ is altogether still limited, the
term already covers diverse meanings within this current literature. This
creates confusion, which thwarts the fruitful development of this increas-
ingly significant approach to causation. To remedy that confusion, it is
necessary to discern different kinds of pluralistic approaches to causation
and different possible positions within them. Therefore, I will try to make
a good start in structuring and clarifying the debate, by introducing some
distinctions in this paper.
Generally, I discern three kinds of causal pluralism: conceptual causal
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pluralism, metaphysical causal pluralism, and epistemological-methodolo-
gical causal pluralism. Each of these oppose their monistic counterparts.
The literature in defense of causal pluralism focuses particularly on the
first kind of causal pluralism: conceptual causal pluralism. Authors sub-
scribing to conceptual causal pluralism maintain that our everyday notion
of ‘causation’ cannot be described univocally, while authors subscribing to
conceptual causal monism maintain that it can. I will briefly revise the
arguments in defense of causal pluralism in section 2.
The main aim of this paper is to clear up part of the confusion in the
causal pluralism debate by discerning different possible positions with re-
spect to metaphysical causal pluralism. This will be done by means of three
central metaphysical questions concerning causation. Firstly, is causation
a realistic notion, or is it a mental construct? Secondly, does causation
only occur as a real relation at the fundamental level of reality, or does
it also occur as a real relation between objects at higher levels of reality?
And lastly, does causation consist in a single empirical relation, or does
it consist in diverse empirical relations deserving the label ‘causal’? The
possible answers to these questions lead to different metaphysical positions,
which will be expounded and illustrated in section 3. Arguing for one or
another metaphysical position is nonetheless not noncommittal. It carries
implications for one’s conceptual approach to causation. In section 4, I
will present the most obvious complementary conceptual approaches to the
different metaphysical positions. Metaphysical causal pluralism will be dis-
cerned from epistemological-methodological causal pluralism in section 5,
where I will briefly comment on the relations between the former and the
latter. Section 6 will contain my final conclusions.
2. Conceptual causal pluralism
Concerning our everyday notion of causation, only one central question
guides the choice for or against causal pluralism: is our everyday notion of
causation monistic or pluralistic? Since I am here concerned with causal
pluralism, I will focus on the arguments in defense of conceptual causal
pluralism. The following three arguments take a central place in the current
literature defending conceptual causal pluralism:
1. All available monistic approaches to causation (e.g., manipulation
approaches, probabilistic approaches, causal mechanism approaches,
counterfactual approaches, etc.) have counterexamples and restric-
tions. Some of these approaches are even clearly inapplicable to cer-
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tain domains of knowledge. (See e.g., Ref. 1.)
2. In some cases, even our everyday intuitions on whether a certain factor
is really the cause of an event are ambiguous. If we would have a
clearly outlined, univocal notion of ‘causation’ at our disposal, this
would not be the case. (See Ref. 2.)
3. In everyday reasoning and decision-making, we do not need to know
what the ‘real’ causes are, for instance whether a probabilistic ap-
proach or rather a counterfactual approach points to the ‘real’ causal
relations in the world. In practice, it mostly suffices to know that fac-
tor C is for example counterfactually dependent on factor E, or that
there is a causal mechanism connecting C and E, etc. One does not
need to know then whether these properties also define ‘real’ causa-
tion. (see Ref. 2.)
It is the first kind of argument, for example, which has led Ned Hall to
conceptual causal dualism.1 Specifically, well-known counterexamples to the
counterfactual analyses of causation have led Hall to a distinction between
causation as dependence and causation as production:
“Causation, understood as a relation between events, comes in at
least two basic and fundamentally different varieties. One of these,
which I call ‘dependence,’ is simply that: counterfactual depen-
dence between wholly distinct events. In this sense, event c is a
cause of (distinct) event e just in case e depends on c; that is, just
in case, had c not occurred, e would not have occurred. The sec-
ond variety is rather more difficult to characterize, but we evoke it
when we say of an event c that it helps to generate or bring about or
produce another event e, and for that reason I call it ‘production’.”
(Ref. 1, p. 225)
What forms the basis for this distinction made by Hall? His analysis
starts with those causal relations that form a counterexample for the coun-
terfactual theory of causation, namely cases of overdetermination. Counter-
factual dependence cannot form an argument for causation in these cases,
since several factors ensuring the effect are simultaneously present:
“Suzy and Billy, expert rock-throwers, are engaged in a competi-
tion to see who can shatter a target bottle first. They both pick
up rocks and throw them at the bottle, but Suzy throws her a split
second before Billy. Consequently Suzy’s rock gets there first, shat-
tering the bottle. Since both throws are perfectly accurate, Billy’s
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would have shattered the bottle if Suzy’s had not occurred, so the
shattering is overdetermined.” (Ref. 1, p. 235)
In this case, Suzy’s throw is a cause of the shattering, but Billy’s throw is
not. The shattering nonetheless does not depend on Suzy’s throw. Since if
Suzy’s throw would not have caused the bottle to shatter, it had shattered
anyway thanks to Billy’s throw. Hall argues that one should add three
theses on causality to solve this problem: the thesis of transitivity, the thesis
of locality, and the thesis of intrinsicness. The first states that causation is
a transitive relation, the second that ‘causes are connected to their effects
via spatiotemporally continuous sequences of causal intermediates’, and the
latter that ‘the causal structure of a process is determined by its intrinsic,
non-causal character’ (Ref. 1, p. 225). These three theses make up for
causation as production. The example above is indeed a case of ‘pure
production’, in which dependence is of no concern.
However, in order to be able to deal with cases of double prevention and
omission, one should throw the three additional theses overboard. In these
cases, counterfactual dependence is the only thesis that matters. Hall gives
the following example of ‘pure dependence’:
“Suzy and Billy have grown up, just in time to get involved in
World War III. Suzy is piloting a bomber on a mission to blow up
an enemy target, and Billy is piloting a fighter as her lone escort.
Along comes an enemy fighter plane, piloted by Enemy. Sharp-
eyed Billy spots Enemy, zooms in, pulls the trigger, and Enemy’s
plane goes down in flames. Suzy’s mission is undisturbed, and
the bombing takes place as planned. If Billy hadn’t pulled the
trigger, Enemy would have eluded him and shot down Suzy, and
the bombing would not have happened.” (Ref. 1, p. 241)
In this example, the effect counterfactually depends on the cause, but
there is no mechanism linking cause and effect. Billy’s pulling the trigger
did not produce the bombing, but it was nonetheless necessary for Suzy to
be able to execute the bomb attack. Hence, the occurrence of the bombing
was dependent on Billy’s pulling the trigger.
The conclusion Hall draws from this analysis is that counterfactual de-
pendence captures only one kind of causal relation, and that another kind
of causal relation exists which needs only the theses of transitivity, local-
ity and intrinsicness but not the thesis of counterfactual dependence. The
former are dependence relations, while the latter are production relations.
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However, typical causes are cases of dependent production rather than pure
production or pure dependence. So although production and dependence
are conceptually distinct, in the actual world their extensions overlap in
most cases. This also clarifies why both kinds of causal relations are easily
jumbled up and a single kind of causal relation is generally supposed.
3. Three metaphysical questions
Let me turn to the central question of this paper: what about metaphysical
causal pluralism? In other words, do metaphysical reasons exist to consider
causal pluralism, or is pluralism with respect to causation only a concep-
tual matter? I discern three central metaphysical questions which should
be answered, and which lead quasi-automatically to certain positions with
respect to the causal pluralism debate. A first question is whether cau-
sation is a real relation, or rather a mental construction. The answer to
this question makes it possible to discern realistic from constructivist views
on causation. Realists should answer a second question, namely whether
‘causation’ refers to a single kind of empirical relation, or rather refers to
different kinds of empirical relations all labeled ‘causal’. I will call the latter
position ‘strong metaphysical causal pluralism’. If one maintains, as most
philosophers do, that ‘causation’ refers to only one kind of empirical rela-
tion in the world, the answer to a last question can determine whether one
is a metaphysical causal monist on the one hand, or rather a weak meta-
physical causal pluralist on the other hand. Namely, the question whether
‘causation’ refers to a relation which only exists between elements at the
elementary level of reality on which all other causal relations then super-
vene, or whether causation is a real relation between all kinds of objects at
all levels of reality. In the following subsections, I will have a closer look
at the possible answers to these three questions and the resulting positions
toward metaphysical pluralism.
3.1. Causation as a realistic notion versus a mental
construct
A first metaphysical question to be posed is whether causation is not just
a mental construct created by mankind. Is there after all some real kind
of relation in the world to which our concept of ‘causation’ refers? Hume’s
famous view on causation calls this into question,3,4 by asserting that cau-
sation is nothing more than constant conjunction in combination with tem-
poral priority of the cause and spatiotemporal contiguity between cause
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and effect. It is the memory of past co-occurrences of the cause and effect
that lead in new instances of the cause to the supposition that the effect
will follow, and hence to the supposition of a constant conjunction between
the cause and effect. However, men further suppose that the connection
between cause and effect is necessary, but this necessity cannot be inferred
from our perceptions. This convinced Hume that, from a philosophical
point of view, causation has to be solely understood in terms of temporal
priority, spatiotemporal contiguity and constant conjunction, and not in
terms of a necessary connection. The idea of the necessity of a causal rela-
tion is a further construction of the human mind upon the more objective
description of causation in terms of constant conjunction, temporal priority
and spatiotemporal contiguity, but this latter description is closest to our
perceptions and hence the one that enables consensus on what causation is.
A similar view has more recently been proposed by Jon Williamson.5,6
In his view labelled epistemic causality, causation is also believed to be a
mental construct. Williamson starts from the assertion that it is just handy
for people to think in terms of cause and effect, and that this is also the rea-
son why they do so, and not that there is something physical corresponding
to the term ‘cause’. Williamson is nonetheless convinced that there is an
objective reference point for the justification of our causal claims, namely
the fullest knowledge of the world. The different views on causation as
outlined in different causal theories, form what he calls different causal in-
dicators. However, this variety of causal indicators does not imply a variety
of concepts of causation, according to Williamson. Our causal beliefs are
based on these several indicators, but all knowledge from all these indicators
of causality would lead together to the fullest knowledge of the world. And
it is precisely this fullest knowledge of the world which forms the objective
reference point of what causation is, and which would deliver a monistic
epistemic concept of causation. To sum up, Williamson maintains that
causality is a feature of our epistemic representation of the world, and not
a real part of the world itself. According to his view, causation further does
not consist of a variety of concepts, but is rather one eclectic notion. Hence,
just like Hume, Williamson defends the metaphysical view that causal rela-
tions are no real part of the world, but relations constructed on this reality
by men. I will call this kind of position metaphysical causal constructivism.
The real challenge for philosophers defending a constructivist metaphysical
approach, is to clarify why it is nonetheless successful and/ or necessary to
think in terms of cause and effect.
In the case one defends the opposite position known as causal realism —
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namely that there ı´s something physical in the world to which our notion
of ‘cause’ refers — further metaphysical questions need to be answered.
These questions and their possible answers will be expounded in the next
two sections. To conclude this section, I first specify what causal realism is.
In its strongest interpretation, causal realism can be described as follows:
“Realism about causation requires two things. First, according to
the realist, causation is objective, meaning that it is something
that occurs in an ‘external reality’ as opposed to something that is
merely subjective, a feature of our thoughts or perceptions alone
(that is, merely an idea or a concept). The distinction between ob-
jective and subjective causation thus concerns the issue of whether
or not causation is mind-independent. Second, according to the
realist, causation involves some sort of necessity with respect to
the connection between causes and effects. . . .
For now, let it suffice to say that by invoking necessity, realists of
different stripes maintain that there is more to causation than mere
constant or probabilistic conjunctions of events. Merely subjective
accounts of causation hold that if there is such a thing as causal
necessity, it is an idea or a concept only. Objective accounts hold
that there is such a thing, and that it is a feature of the world quite
apart from our ideas or concepts.” (Ref. 7, p. 8)
I think this definition captures clearly what causal realism involves. I
have nonetheless presented the theories of Hume and Williamson above
which both maintain that causation is a mental construction that can
nonetheless be conceived as objective. Consequently, the definition would
still be clearer when the terms ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ were replaced
with respectively ‘not-mental’ and ‘mental’. Further, the reverse claim can
be found as well: Huw Price defends in Refs. 8 and 9 a view on causation
which holds that causality is not a mental notion, but meanwhile neither
fully objective. Price’s approach results in a rather weak version of causal
realism. Regardless of whether one defends causal realism in a strong or
in a rather weak sense, if it is accepted that something in the world ex-
ists to which our notion of cause refers, two further metaphysical questions
obtrude themselves.
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3.2. Causation as a single versus a plural empirical relation
A second metaphysical question is whether our notion of ‘cause’ refers to
a single kind of relation in the world or whether several kinds of empiri-
cal relations have to be discerned, although they are all labeled ‘causal’.
This last option has been advanced by Ned Hall in Ref. 1. Hall interprets
his distinction between production and dependence in the first place as a
conceptual distinction, as it was presented in section 2. He nonetheless
explicitly mentions the possibility to interpret his view as one making a
metaphysical distinction:
“A more subtle objection is the following: What I have really shown
is not that there are two concepts of causation, but rather that there
are two kinds of causation, two different ways in which one event
can be a cause of another. That may well be right; certainly, I
was happy to begin this paper by announcing that event-causation
comes in two ‘varieties.’ I do not know how to judge the matter,
because I am not sufficiently clear on what underlies this distinction
between concepts and kinds. . . .
I am quite content to agree that I have (merely) shown that
there are two kinds of causation — as long as those who insist on
this rendering of my thesis agree that the two kinds answer to very
different criteria and consequently require very different analyses.”
(Ref. 1, p. 255–256)
Hall even advances the possibility that further research will demonstrate
that even more empirical kinds of causal relations should be discerned. As
far as I know, Hall is currently the only philosopher explicitly defending a
dualistic position toward causation that can be metaphysically interpreted.
It is clearly not at all easy to substantiate this kind of position, which I like
to label strong metaphysical causal pluralism. Consequently, the opposite
answer, namely that causation is a single kind of empirical relation, remains
the most obvious view. John L. Mackie as well as Phil Dowe, for example,
described causation as a single kind of empirical relation. However, a last
metaphysical question divides their views.
3.3. Causation as a relation between elements at the
fundamental versus at all levels of reality
The last metaphysical question is whether causation is a relation only ex-
isting at the fundamental level of reality on which other ‘causal relations’
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then supervene, or whether causation has to be interpreted as a real relation
between all kinds of objects at all levels of reality. Phil Dowe follows the
former route in the view on causation presented in Physical Causation.10
In this book, Dowe defends an approach to causation which is based on
Salmon’s process theory:
“The approach to be taken is to modify Salmon’s theory by in-
troducing the concept of a conserved quantity. The central idea is
that it is the possession of a conserved quantity, rather than the
ability to transmit a mark, that makes a process a causal process.”
(Ref. 10, p. 89)
This leads to the following central claims of Dowe’s own process theory:
CQ1. A causal interaction is an intersection of world lines which
involves exchange of a conserved quantity.
CQ2. A causal process is a world line of an object which possesses
a conserved quantity.
A ‘conserved quantity’ is any quantity which is universally con-
served, and current scientific theory is our best guide as to what
these are. Thus, we have good reason to believe that mass–
energy, linear momentum, and charge are conserved quantities.
(Ref. 11, p. 323)
Dowe’s theory of causation in terms of ‘conserved quantities’ raises sev-
eral questions. Most importantly, although Dowe presents his own, rather
physical approach as superior to its opponents, it is not at all clear how
to apply it to the knowledge from other scientific domains. Some informa-
tion which he only obliquely hints to is crucial to understand Dowe’s point
of view. It turns out that he underpins his approach to causation with a
reductionistic metaphysical position:
“. . . One answer is that the generality of ‘conserved quantity’ might
allow this to be used as a testable conjecture in various fields of
science. But it is unlikely that it would stand the test: conser-
vation laws seem to be confined to the physical sciences. A more
desirable option is to take a middle road and adopt a supervenience
account such as that of Kim12 where causes supervene on conserved
quantities.13” (Ref. 14, p. 214–215)
January 2, 2008 17:57 Proceedings Trim Size: 9in x 6in AMLeenDeVreeseEdit02
10
Peter Menzies summarizes this view of Jaegwon Kim, on which Dowe
founds his own approach of causation, as follows:
“There is a supervenient causal relation, Kim tells us, between the
a’s having F and b’s having G just in case there are two events a’s
having F ∗ and b’s having G∗ such that a’s having F supervenes on
a’s having F ∗, b’s having G supervenes on b’s having G∗, and a’s
having F ∗ causes b’s having G∗. It is Kim’s view that all macrolevel
causal relations are supervenient causal relations of this kind, where
the causal relations at the base level relate microlevel events. . . . He
sees the rationale for his view that all macrolevel causal relations
are supervenient causal relations as lying in what he calls the thesis
of microdeterminism, according to which the world is the way it
is because the microworld is the way it is. He sees this thesis as
urging us to look on the causal order of the macroworld as emerging
out of the causal order of the microworld.” (Ref. 13, p. 554)
This metaphysical premise, according to which causation in the world
has to be reduced to the domain of physics, clarifies the whole argumen-
tation behind Dowe’s position in Physical Causation. I label this position
which maintains that our notion of ‘causation’ refers to one kind of empir-
ical relation at a single, basic level of reality metaphysical causal monism.
The challenge for metaphysical causal monists, such as Dowe, lies in the
justification of their metaphysical point of view. An important argument
in defense of this point of view is that we should accept it if we take our
physicalistic world view seriously.12 This argument is opposed by philoso-
phers substantiating the claim that physicalism accommodates an onto-
logical preconception with respect to physics which cannot be united with
scientific knowledge and scientific practice (e.g., Stephen Webster,15 Nancy
Cartwright,16 Michael Silberstein17):
“The commonest justification of this position is simply to point
out that higher level phenomena often cannot be predicted from a
knowledge of the component part that constitute the lower level.
Take water for example: its behaviour cannot be predicted simply
from a knowledge of hydrogen and oxgyen [sic.]. For the anti-
reductionist, this inability is not simply a result of ignorance. It
is a matter of principle that every level has its own characteristic
patterns and processes, particular to that level, and not replaceable
by the patterns and processes of a lower level.” (Ref. 15, p. 54)
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The latter conviction does not need to imply strong metaphysical causal
pluralism, but can be accommodated with a position in between strong
metaphysical causal pluralism and metaphysical causal monism, which I
label weak metaphysical causal pluralism. This position entails that cau-
sation is a single kind of relation, which nonetheless occurs at all levels
of reality as a real, and hence not-reducible, relation. John L. Mackie’s
approach seems to belong to this category. Mackie defines causation, after
John Stuart Mill, as a complex regularity:
“In F, all (ABC¯ or DGH¯ or JKL¯) are followed by P, and in F,
all P are preceded by (ABC¯ or DGH¯ or JKL¯). . . . That is, some
disjunction of conjunctions of factors, some of which may be neg-
ative, is both necessary and sufficient for the effect in the field in
question.” (Ref. 18, p. 63)
In this definition, negative causes are presented formally as X¯. Further,
F represents the causal field, which forms the background of the causal
event, but is no part of the cause itself according to Mackie. He maintains
that a theory trying to describe what causality is in the world, has to
be concerned with these whole complex regularities. Although Mackie is
further not very explicit about his metaphysical position, it becomes clear
from his account that he would defend that causation consists of a single
kind of empirical relation, in line with his conceptual approach. Unlike
Dowe, he seems nevertheless convinced that this relation is present as a real
relation in all domains of reality, what makes Mackie a weak metaphysical
causal pluralist:
“I insist that our concept is in several ways a bit indeterminate:
‘cause’ can mean slightly different things on different occasions, and
about some problematic cases, for example of over-determination,
we may be unsure what to say. But it is still a fairly unitary
concept: we do not have one concept for physical causation and
another for human actions and interaction (as someone might be
forced to say who took our concept of physical causation to be
that of regular succession); we can and do assert similar coun-
terfactual necessity (and at times sufficiency) about fields of all
different sorts.” (Ref. 18, p. xi)
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4. The relations between metaphysical and conceptual
positions
In the previous section, I discerned four possible metaphysical positions
toward causation: metaphysical causal constructivism, strong metaphysi-
cal causal pluralism, weak metaphysical causal pluralism and metaphysical
causal monism. Arguing for one or another of these positions is not noncom-
mittal. It carries implications for one’s conceptual approach to causation.
Let me run through the various metaphysical positions again to point out
what the most obvious complementary conceptual approach would be.
In John Williamson’s case, it is the specific form of his theory in terms
of epistemic causality which leads to what I interpret as a kind of con-
ceptual causal pluralism, namely the conviction that we refer to a unitary
epistemic concept by way of divergent causal indicators. Jon Williamson
himself states that his view forms an improved monistic approach to cau-
sation, which has the advantage of being able to deal with the epistemic
usefulness of a variety of ‘causal indicators’ (causal mechanisms, counter-
factuals, correlations, etc.). I think this interpretation of his own view on
causation should be refined by introducing a distinction between conceptual
causal monism/pluralism and epistemological causal monism/pluralisma.
The term ‘conceptual’ is used as before to refer to our everyday concept(s)
of causation, which guide(s) the way(s) we come to our everyday causal
judgements. I further use the term ‘epistemological-methodological’ to re-
fer to the meaning of causation from a knowledge point of view. I would
prefer then to interpret Williamson’s approach as a combination of concep-
tual causal pluralism and epistemological causal monism: in daily practice,
we make use of a variety of causal indicators, but once we would possess
the fullest knowledge of the world, one concept of causation would reveal
itself from it. Consequently, causal theories explicate different everyday
interpretations of the notion ‘cause’, that nonetheless indicate together a
single — be it eclectic — epistemic concept. Another filling-in of a meta-
physical causal constructivist theory of causation can just as well lead to
conceptual causal monism. Hume maintained for example that only one
concept of cause (in terms of spatiotemporal contiguity, temporal prior-
ity and constant conjunction) is good enough to serve as our concept of
cause,3 since the other ways in which we are inclined to capture our notion
of cause face epistemological problems. This revisionistic stance of Hume
aI go deeper into epistemological causal monism/pluralism in section 5.
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gets him to defending a monistic conceptual approach to causation on the
basis of his constructivist metaphysical position. Hence, the choice for or
against conceptual causal pluralism is in the case of metaphysical causal
constructivism entirely dependent on the specific premises of the causal
theory defended.
A thoroughly substantiated strong metaphysical pluralism, on the other
hand, automatically forms a strong argument for the necessity of conceptual
causal pluralism. Discerning production and dependence as two different
kinds of causal relations in the world, as Ned Hall proposes,1 implies the
need to have at least also this distinction in our conceptual apparatus in
order to make appropriate causal judgements.
Even so does a thoroughly substantiated metaphysical monism automat-
ically form an argument in defense of conceptual causal monism. Hence,
Phil Dowe’s conviction that causation only consists of a unique empirical re-
lation at the fundamental organizational level of the world necessitates him
to be revisionistic.14 His metaphysical conviction grounds the way he rejects
all alternative approaches to causation in favor of his own approach in terms
of causal processes and conserved quantities. In Ref. 19, Dowe nonetheless
agrees that omissions and preventers can in practice not always easily be
distinguished from genuine causes, although they are not physically con-
nected to their effects and consequently are no genuine causes according to
his view. Dowe labels them ‘quasi-causes’, and states that it is even use-
ful practically to treat quasi-causation as genuine causation. Furthermore,
causation and quasi-causation seem to play very similar practical roles.
According to Dowe, the unity of both lies in the fact that quasi-causation
is, in essence, possible causation. Distinguishing them is nonetheless im-
portant theoretically. Since ‘causation’ appears in the definition of what
‘quasi-causation’ is, they cannot be treated as being the same. Hence,
a description of genuine causation should throw cases of quasi-causation
overboard. It follows that we should revise our notion of cause, such that
quasi-causes are not included in our description.
The most natural complement of weak metaphysical causal pluralism is
also conceptual causal monism. In the quotation at the end of the former
section, Mackie, for instance, clearly argues for a single, unitary concept
applicable throughout all possible domains of application.
However, things are not that straightforward, and some further com-
ments are needed. The first comment concerns pragmatical considerations.
Mackie creates some place for play which has to accommodate his view to
pragmatical differences in causal judgements. According to his theory, in
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which a cause is supposed to be the factor which is necessary in the circum-
stances for the effect to occur, differences in everyday causal judgements
can be attributed to the way we select ‘the’ cause from the factors of the
disjunction of conditions:
“The supposed distinction between conditions and causes can be
adequately accounted for in these two ways: an alleged condition
which is not called a cause, although if in the circumstances it
had not occurred the result would not, either is part of the field
presupposed in the view taken by the speaker of the result (and so
is not a cause in relation to this field) or is a cause, but mention
of this fact happens to be irrelevant, or less relevant than mention
of some other cause of the same result, to some current purpose.”
(Ref. 18, p. 36)
Pragmatical factors do not affect Mackie’s basic concept of cause, al-
though they can affect the causal judgements resulting thereof. Apart from
Mackie’s approach, pragmatical considerations can also be introduced to
justify the defense of a monistic conceptual approach where a pluralistic ap-
proach seems more obvious and the reverse. Some metaphysical approaches
seem to leave more room for this kind of considerations than others. Weak
conceptual causal pluralism as well as metaphysical causal monism seem
to be approaches that can easily be combined with pragmatically based
conceptual causal pluralism. For example with regard to Dowe’s theory,
one could argue that we will need a variety of concepts of causation for ev-
eryday causal reasoning as long as we do not possess enough knowledge to
determine how specific causal relations in the macroworld depend on their
underlying physical constitution. On the other hand, it seems much less
obvious to argue for a combination of strong metaphysical causal pluralism
with pragmatically based conceptual causal monism. However, the central
conclusion is that it is utterly important to provide thorough pragmatical
arguments to underpin atypical combinations.
Further, one position which is possible in principle has nonetheless not
been discussed. It forms no obvious point of view and is nowhere defended
in the literature, as far as I know. It concerns a metaphysical position which
defends that all causal relations have to be reduced to the elementary level
but that diverse empirical kinds of causal relations nonetheless exist at that
basic level. The most natural conceptual complement of such a position
would clearly be conceptual causal pluralism.
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5. Epistemological-methodological causal pluralism
To conclude, I briefly indicate the importance of discerning conceptual and
metaphysical causal pluralism from a third kind of approach to causal plu-
ralism, namely what I label epistemological- methodological causal plural-
ism. The latter refers to the importance of a pluralistic view on causation
for our scientific knowledge in general on the one hand, and for assembling
causal knowledge in specific domains of science on the other hand. It will be
clear that an epistemological-methodological approach to causation is not
disconnected from conceptual and metaphysical approaches to causation. It
is nonetheless important to value this line of approach as different from the
others. Especially in the case of conceptual and/or metaphysical pluralism,
certain questions become utterly important for the sake of our knowledge.
What is the best way to acquire causal knowledge? Do the useful concepts
of causation differ from domain to domain? Do we need a variety of causal
concepts to achieve sufficient causal knowledge within one domain? What
are the useful concepts of causation for the different scientific domains? If
causation is a single empirical relation, why do we possibly need a variety
of causal concepts to gather scientific knowledge? Do scientists make use
of a variety of concepts in practice? The answers to these questions will be
affected by the conceptual and especially metaphysical position taken, but
can on their turn affect the way causal knowledge is gathered and subse-
quently what causal knowledge is reached. This demonstrates again that
arguing for certain conceptual and/or metaphysical positions, is not at all
a noncommittal activity.
6. Conclusion
‘Causal pluralism’ is a very broad notion, covering entirely divergent ap-
proaches to causation. The conviction that causation is no single, univocal
thing can lead to a wide area of alternative ‘pluralistic’ approaches to cau-
sation. Consequently, I argued that the confusion in the current debate on
causal pluralism should be avoided by refining our view on causal pluralism.
In the first place, one should make a clear distinction between three ways
to approach the debate: from a conceptual point of view, from a metaphys-
ical point of view or from an epistemological-methodological point of view.
I focused in this paper on metaphysical approaches to causation and dis-
cerned four possible metaphysical positions: metaphysical causal construc-
tivism, metaphysical causal monism, weak metaphysical causal pluralism
and strong metaphysical causal pluralism. Each of these positions can be
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related to the most obvious conceptual counterpart, i.e., conceptual causal
monism or conceptual causal pluralism. It is utterly important precisely
to determine one’s position in the debate and to become aware of mutual
connections between certain positions in order to improve the discussion.
I hope to have offered a general framework that can help in creating more
clarity. The further development of appropriate and fruitful pluralistic ap-
proaches should benefit from a refined view on what ‘causal pluralism’ can
consist in. On the other hand, it is evident that the framework itself may
also need further development in the course of the discussion, when new
lines of argumentation are developed.
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